Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 24 | Number 1

Article 3

January 2019

Human Rights Violations Consequent to
Transshipment Practices in Fisheries
Chelsey F. Marto
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Part of the Admiralty Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian
Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons
Recommended Citation
Chelsey F. Marto, Human Rights Violations Consequent to Transshipment Practices in Fisheries, 24 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 32 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol24/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized editor of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONSEQUENT TO
TRANSSHIPMENT PRACTICES IN FISHERIES
Chelsey Marto

I. INTRODUCTION
II. PRESENTING THE PROBLEM
A. The Practice of Transshipment
B. Examples of Human Rights Violations
C. Statistical Data Regarding Transshipment and Human
Rights Abuses
III. CURRENT LAW
A. European Union and United States Laws Regarding
Transshipment
B. Patchwork of Regulations
IV. PROPOSED STRATEGIES
A. Bans
B. Technological Tracking
C. Buyer Supply Chain Management
D. Anti-Trafficking Measures
E. Sanctions and Import Restrictions
1. Drawbacks of Sanctions
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF PAST SANCTIONS
A. EU Sanctions on IUU Fishing
B. United States Sanctions on IUU Fishing
C. Case Study: Thailand
D. Case Study: New Zealand
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD
A. Application: Argentina Case Study
VII.CONCLUSION

32

2019]

Human Rights: Transshipment

33

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONSEQUENT TO
TRANSSHIPMENT PRACTICES IN FISHERIES
Chelsey Marto 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Pope Francis once said, “[h]uman rights are not only violated by
terrorism, repression, and assassination, but also by unfair economic
structures that create huge inequalities.” 2 Pertinent to economic activity
on the high seas remains the fishing industry, where innumerable
individuals are kept, out of sight, unnoticed, and exploited for their work
over the course of long stretches of time. 3 This phenomenon is partly
because of the process of transshipment, which helps provide segments of
the fishing industry with the ability to retain and manipulate workers
thereon for months, if not years. 4
Simply stated, transshipment involves offloading catch from a fishing
vessel to a refrigerated cargo vessel off the port. 5 Often, this is done out of
sight and out on the high seas, where oversight and regulation are virtually
non-existent and no specific country has jurisdiction over the area. 6
Consequently, this activity allows for nefarious activity, including human
trafficking and other human rights abuses. 7 Increased regulation and
oversight of transshipment practices remain necessary in countering the
reprehensible human rights violations existent within the fishing industry. 8
Transshipment describes the process of transferring fish from a
smaller fishing vessel to a larger mothership, usually on the high seas and
far from shore. 9 In principle, this practice is a benefit to fishing fleets
because vessels can offload their catch while at sea and continue fishing
1. J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maine School of Law.
2. Mark Rice-Oxley, Pope Francis: the Humble Pontiff with Practical Approach to
Poverty, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 13, 2013, 3:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/mar/13/jorge-mario-bergoglio-pope-poverty [https://perma.cc/5N2D-W8UG].
3. David A. Kroodsma et al., The Global View of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary
Findings, SKYTRUTH AND GLOB. FISH WATCH 1, 16 (Aug. 2017).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 1, 17.
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 5.
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without going back to shore, allowing fishing companies to reduce fuel
costs and catch more fish for market faster. 10 This practice remains
technically legal, with caveats, throughout most of the world. However,
transshipment is not closely monitored and many loopholes exist, allowing
for both destructive and illegal behavior to continue happening, including
various human rights abuses. 11 When conducted intentionally,
transshipment allows fishing companies “to avoid higher duty rates levied
on certain countries, avoid import restrictions such as visa and quota
restrictions, or make use of a special trade program to drastically lower
duty rates.” 12 Similarly, lack of regulation over transshipment practices
allow for crews to be kept at sea for months, if not years, at a time without
getting back to the port, making it difficult to report on or escape from
emotional, mental, or physical abuse, poor working conditions, violence,
or murder on board fishing vessels. 13
Commercial fishing remains one of the most dangerous professions
in the world with extremely high injury and mortality rates brought on by
unsafe working conditions onboard the fishing vessels. 14 Additionally,
cases of human rights violations have become increasingly regular over
the past several years. 15 Moreover, cases of unexplained disappearances
of workers onboard fishing vessels has also increased in frequency. 16
Consequently, transshipment is considered one of the most high-risk
activities in the industry by opening the door for violations such as those
described above. 17
This comment examines how the practice of transshipment and how
the lack of regulation, oversight, and other avenues for international action
has allowed human rights abuses to occur. The patchwork of regulation
10. Id.
11. Katherine Martinko, How the Fishing Industry Gets Away with Everything from
Illegal Catches to Human Slavery, TREEHUGGER (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.treehugger
.com/green-food/how-fish-industry-gets-away-everything-illegal-catches-humanslavery.html [https://perma.cc/7AZK-8TUK].
12. What is Transshipment?, INFORMED TRADE: INTERNATIONAL IMPORT/EXPORT,
http://www.itintl.com/what-is-transshipment.html [https://perma.cc/599A-W8AD].
13. Wendy Laursen, Human Rights in Focus, THE MAR. EXEC. (May 4, 2017, 01:52
AM), http://maritime-executive.com/article/human-rights-in-focus [https://perma.cc/
58MU-932T].
14. Fisheries Abuses and Related Deaths at Sea in the Pacific Region, HUMAN RTS. AT
SEA 5 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
HRAS-Fisheries-Abuse-Investigative-Report-Dec-2017-SECURED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD6W-CLSQ].
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4.
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currently available will be examined and criticized in terms of its
effectiveness in addressing the issue. Additionally, this comment will
discuss the alternative solutions proposed over the past couple of years and
ultimately suggest the best course of action for networks of international
law and public policy to move forward in shifting from a lack of
understanding, regard, and neglect of the issue, to implementing plausible
and effective strategies concerning the correction of past abuses and
prevention of future abuses against workers in the fishing industry.
II. PRESENTING THE PROBLEM
A. The Practice of Transshipment
Human rights abuses at sea have a surplus of root causes: “greed,
cultural inequity, corruption, and global and domestic economic
conditions.” 18 Additionally, with the environmental concern of
overfishing, companies must go farther away from shore than ever before
to catch an adequate quantity of fish. 19 This has been particularly true since
the mid-1990’s, because the demand for fish has been steadily increasing,
while the supply of fish has steadily been decreasing. 20 This increases the
demand for transshipment opportunities, which allows fishing vessels to
stay out at sea for longer periods of time without having to return to shore
very often and increases the ease with which they can commit such
violations without getting caught or reprimanded for doing so. 21
Those engaging in transshipment practices have a large economic
incentive to continue transshipment practices. Rendering frequent trips to
shore unnecessary reduces both fuel costs and increases the amount of time
available to continue fishing, thereby increasing the supply available to be
sold at market, which increases the revenue. 22 Additionally, because labor
conditions are not strictly monitored, companies can underpay or refuse to
pay workers without facing legal repercussions for doing so and, again,

18. Sarah G. Lewis, et al., Human Rights and the Sustainability of Fisheries, FISHWISE
381
(2017), https://users.soe.ucsc.edu/~msmangel/Lewis%20et%20al%202017%20
human% 20rights%20and%20fisheries%20sustainability.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Daniel Pauly & Dirk Zeller, Catch Reconstructions Reveal that Global Marine
Fisheries Catches are Higher than Reported and Declining, NATURE COMM. 7 (Jan. 19,
2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10244 [https://perma.cc/6UZP-RC25?
type=image].
21. Lewis, et al., supra note 18, at 381.
22. Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 1.
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decrease the fixed costs otherwise associated with the fishing industry. 23
From a purely economic perspective, it remains in companies’ best interest
to continue such practices, especially when companies are based on
developing countries where money is rationed. 24
Transshipment is a common practice involved in unregulated fishing,
which has been linked to numerous organized, transnational crimes at sea,
including human trafficking, smuggling of migrant workers, and forced
labor. 25 Though numerous attempts to end this practice have arisen, entire
fishing industries are still heavily reliant on the practice, particularly those
in developing countries with limited resources or ability to monitor and
enforce regulations on international waters. Consequently, the workers on
those ships are more vulnerable than workers from countries with tighter
regulations. 26
B. Examples of Human Rights Violations
Slave labor lowers shipping costs, incentivizing shipping companies
from impoverished nations to recruit workers through unethical means that
violate human rights laws. 27 Workers are often recruited by manning
agencies in developing countries, offered false promises of compensation.
Later, they are asked to pay agencies as justification for indentured
servitude, robbed of documents that promised compensation, and then
forced into slavery. 28 Usually, they are either underpaid or unpaid and held
at sea for years, where human rights violations thereafter continue.29
Additionally, workers are often forced to work in horrendous
conditions, such as malnourishment and lack of sleep, with only sparse
visits from the mothership to serve as ineffective oversight of the
transshipment practices. 30 Ships are usually at sea for months at a time,
giving fishermen an avenue for conducting cruel and inhumane
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Charlotte Middlehurst, Transshipping Spurs Trade in Illegal Fishing Led by
Russia, CHINA DIALOGUE, (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2017/03/transshippingspurs-trade-illegal-fishing-led-russia [https://perma.cc/AY54-F28U].
26. Id.
27. Christopher Ewell, et al., Potential Ecological and Social Benefits of a Moratorium
on Transshipment on the High Seas, 81 MARINE POL’Y 293, 293 (2017).
28. Id. at 293-94.
29. Id. at 294.
30. See Katarina Zimmer, How Seafood’s “Dark Web” Obscures Fraud, Fish
Laundering, and Slavery on the High Seas, THE NEW FOOD ECON. (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://newfoodeconomy.com/seafood-dark-web-fish-fraud-transshipment/
?mc_cid=809b7dada3&mc_eid=f5333d4f15 [https://perma.cc/838Z-SXG7].
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confinement of countless poverty-stricken, illiterate workers who were
forced into signing contracts they did not understand. Often, workers are
bought, sold, kept on vessels for months, forced to work twenty-hour shifts
by taking methamphetamines, and endure beatings, torture, and executionstyle killings. 31
Specific examples of this run abundant. 32 Frequent cases of physical
and sexual violence against crew members, assaults on crew members’
mental health which have regularly been linked to self-harm, frequent
denial of wages, crew members being forced to work under dangerous and
even fatal working conditions daily, inadequate food and water supply that
is safe for consumption, and cases of human trafficking all run rampant.33
C. Statistical Data Regarding Transshipment and Human Rights
Abuses
Data involving the scale and conduct of transshipment within the
industry has been incredibly difficult to collect, given the vast size and
rural nature of worldwide fishing regions, as well as the lack of oversight
on board. 34 In fact, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization contends
that approximately half of the production estimates in the fishing industry
off the Pacific region are guesswork. 35
Major discrepancies exist between the reported data and reality
regarding the fishing industry in many developing countries, such as
Thailand. Transshipment dates and locations, when compared with data
gathered from the European Union’s Directorate-General for Health and
Food Safety’s auditing team, revealed major discrepancies in
transshipment dates, with Thai ships reportedly having unknown locations
for products ranging from eighteen days to four months. 36 Additionally,

31. Martinko, supra note 11.
32. See Fisheries Abuses and Related Deaths at Sea in the Pacific Region, supra note
14, at 5-7 (provides a detailed description of nearly fifteen case studies discovered
involving human rights violations at sea over the past decade, several of which were
directly linked to the transshipment practices their vessels partook in).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 4.
35. Fisheries of the Pacific Islands, RAP PUBL’NS 3 (Mar. 2011), http://www.fao.org
/docrep/014/i2092e/ i2092e00.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXT9-NBWU].
36. Francisco Blaha, The EU Delivers Another Bad Tuna Compliance Report to
Thailand, IUUWATCH (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2017/03/eu-deliversanother-bad-tunacompliance-report-thailand/ [https://perma.cc/2PUN-X3P9].
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locations being fished were different from ones notated by the Thai fishing
industry themselves. 37
Recent reports indicate that nearly forty percent of likely and
potential rendezvous from legal and reported transshipment courses occur
by vessels run by countries with little regulation and oversight, with
another forty percent of likely and potential rendezvous occurring on the
high seas, where no one country in particular has jurisdiction over. 38
Additionally, studies show that fishermen in countries with increased
regulation are more likely to move to another country with decreased
regulation than to comply with the increased regulations and tighter
restrictions in their home countries. 39
The regulations regarding transshipment practices are patchworked;
there is no cohesive strategy and oversight, no regulation clearly
explaining proper etiquette over transshipment practices to ensure illegal
fishing and human rights violations do not occur. 40 Different countries
have different regulations, resources, and capabilities. 41 Additionally,
while some countries signed agreements to diminish human rights
violations on the high seas, other countries have avoided being held
accountable for nefarious activity on the seas, with little to no
consequence. 42 Refusing to hold certain countries responsible for
unethical employment practices in the fishing industry makes eradicating
human trafficking and other inhumane exploitation practices
extraordinarily difficult and, consequently, action taken to counter these
abuses remains limited in the countries causing the most devastation. 43
III. CURRENT LAW
Certain countries, including member states within the European Union
as well as the United States, have a surplus of regulations regarding
transshipment practices. Others, however, have little to no regulatory
framework established regarding transshipment practices, which often
provides a surplus of avenues the ship’s operator can take to lower various
costs by abusing workers.
37. Id.
38. Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. at 3.
42. See Sofia Galani, The “New” Human Rights at Sea Debate, The Maritime
Executive (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials
/the-new-human-rights-at-sea-debate [https://perma.cc/3DH6-XXAU].
43. Id.
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A. European Union and United States Laws Regarding
Transshipment
The United States has very detailed restrictions regarding
transshipment practices, including prohibitions on transshipment practices
involving ships equipped with purse seine gear, prohibitions on off-shore
transshipment without a Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC) observer present, prohibitions on receiving
transshipped fish from more than one vessel without an independent
observer present, and prohibitions on transshipping goods with an
unauthorized vessel or a vessel from a non-cooperating member or nonmember country. 44 These prohibitions, among several others, are designed
to reduce cases of illegal fishing and various human rights abuses carried
out against migrant workers. 45
The European Union has also adopted a regulatory framework to
counter unethical transshipment practices on the high seas. As a part of
these regulations, all transshipment operations outside of EU-controlled
regions are strictly prohibited and transshipment practices can only take
place in designated ports within the EU Member States’ control. 46
Additionally, all transshipment practices must be recorded in a catch
certificate to enable better monitoring of transshipment operations. 47
B. Patchwork of Regulations
Many other countries, particularly Asian nations off the Pacific, have
little to no regulatory framework, which allows for many more human
rights violations to occur at sea. This is largely because developing
countries with weak regulatory frameworks have no independent observer,
verification or monitoring of transnational criminal activities or human
rights violations, nor adequate and well-enforced regulations. 48
Additionally, transshipment poses a greater challenge on the high seas,
because practices are barely regulated and no specific country has
jurisdiction over the area. 49

44. See 50 CFR § 300.216 (2012).
45. See id.
46. Handbook on the Practical Application of the IUU Regulation, European
Commission, (Sep. 29, 2008), 14, https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs
/body/handbook_original_en.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K7ZA-BCBF].
47. Id. at 36.
48. See id. at 86.
49. Zimmer, supra note 30, at 5.
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There are no minimum standards of working conditions adopted
internationally. 50 Consequently, many worker’s fishing vessels are left to
the mercy of their operators, who frequently exploit their workers for
profit. 51 Vessel owners are usually not onboard ships when abuses happen
and the skipper, who often has authority to act in the capacity of the owner
when they are absent, often does not accept enough responsibility over
crew members’ safety. 52
Additionally, loopholes exist regarding the registration of boats within
specific jurisdictions. In fact, one of the primary reasons why so many
human rights violations occur is because policies on transshipment vary
by exclusive economic zones, flag states, and regions around the world,
where regions with relatively strong regulatory frameworks have tighter
controls than regions with weak regulatory frameworks. 53 Often,
industries can register in a third state, of which neither the crew nor the
vessels originated. 54 This practice, known as “flags of convenience,”
requires the flag State to assume responsibility over regulation of the
vessel, with limited exceptions. 55 This leads to a lack of legal jurisdiction
over the boat, which exacerbates the problem of unsafe working conditions
and human rights abuses and diminishes legal responsibilities that
otherwise would be incurred by the fishing company registered in a third
state. 56
International laws do not address the content and scope of the problem,
nor the complexities intricately interwoven in the fishing and processing
industries. 57 The international legal framework does not target serious
infringements on human rights with deterrent actions that deprive
offenders of economic benefits derived from illicit activities, with the
monitoring, control, and surveillance systems scarcely used or poorly
executed. 58 This is particularly true in more undeveloped regions where
50. James Sloan, The Legal Challenges of Improving Working Conditions on
Commercial Fishing Vessels, SIWATIBAU & SLOAN 4 (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.
sas.com.fj/ocean-law-bulletins/the-challenge-of-improving-working-conditions-oncommercial-fishing-vessels [https://perma.cc/H6JS-2TSF].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Kroodsma, supra note 3, at 2, 5.
54. Id. at 11-12.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Georgi Gotev, Thai Seafood Products could be Banned in Europe, Warns MEP,
THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015
/jul/23/thai-seafood-products-banned-europe-mep-gabriel-mato [https://perma.cc/NQV2WQYU].
58. Id.
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the threats of human rights abuses are greater, and the governments in
those regions are unwilling to cooperate with the developed world’s
standards; primarily due to its increase in cost, time, and lack of incentive
to comply given the absence of deterrent actions taken by more developed
countries to encourage more ethical conduct on behalf of the loosely
regulated nations. 59
IV. PROPOSED STRATEGIES
A Global effort is required to appropriately address this problem.
Though traditional legal tactics are generally not effective for the reasons
addressed above, many Non-Governmental Organizations and
governments from developed countries, including the European Union,
have increased their global focus on this issue and have launched several
strategies to help rectify the problem. 60
A. Bans
Perhaps the most zealous measure often proposed are attempts to ban
transshipment practices at sea entirely. Though this would clearly
eradicate any problems with transshipment that currently exist if strictly
followed, the practicality of this measure leaves something to be desired.61
This strategy remains unrealistic given the legal framework regarding
transshipment internationally. Due to Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations (hereafter “RFMOs”), laws regarding fisheries
management and the fishing industry are primarily overseen by
commissions from different countries around the globe. Where members
make proposals and vote on a consensus-basis, providing ample
opportunities for countries that do not agree with the proposals to opt out
and suffer little to no consequences for opting out of tighter regulations.62
Often, these proposals impose economic hardships on fishing companies
in developing countries, whose economic incentives lay in continuing
transshipment practices and the dishonest behavior related to illegal
fishing and human trafficking that is often times involved. 63 Consequently,
imposition of transshipment bans remain both incredibly rare and largely
59. See id.
60. Danielle Beurteaux, A High-Tech Solution to End Illegal Fishing, GREENBIZ (Aug.
3, 2017), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/high-tech-solution-end-illegal-fishing [https://
perma.cc/MC42-A4TY].
61. See Ewell, et al., supra note 27, at 293-94.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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ineffective, given the incentives in continuing these practices and the
relative ease at which fishing companies can avoid running their industries
in countries with tighter regulations, allowing them to ignore any
transshipment restrictions or bans without facing negative repercussions
for doing so. 64
B. Technological Tracking
Another proposed strategy remains: increasing technological tracking
onboard all vessels used by fishing industries, regardless of ship size.65
This practice can take various forms, including digitizing records,
installing mandatory on-board cameras to monitor transshipment
practices, adopting global catch documentation schemes, mandating
vessel tracking, and requiring unique identifiers for all fishing vessels. 66
This would essentially serve as an expansion of practices generally
conducted on board larger vessels already and extending it to smaller ships
that currently lack the ability to purchase the devices and, consequently,
are usually the culprits when human rights violations do occur, because of
how little transparency remains onboard. 67
Similar to problems associated with bans, technological tracking will
remain largely ineffective if attempts to impose new protocol relating to
tracking is instituted by laws and regulations. Companies economically
advantaged by transshipment practices have little incentive to change
protocol without outside forces penalizing them for continuing, given the
opportunities for countries to opt out of multi-nation regulations and the
ability of companies located in countries that do increase restrictions on
transshipment practices to move to countries that do not regulate
transshipment practices closely. Conversely, incentivizing companies to
institute technological tracking capabilities through imposing sanctions
and refusing imports of companies that do not comply will most likely be
more effective, because it detracts from the economic incentives
companies have in utilizing transshipment abilities in exploiting workers
for economic gain and replaces this incentive with negative economic
repercussions for continuing transshipment practices.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Middlehurst, supra note 25.
Id.
See id.
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C. Buyer Supply Chain Management
Another proposed strategy for combatting human rights violations
during transshipment involves incentivizing large-scale buyers ensuring
that the seafood suppliers do not use abused, trafficked, or underage
workers through direct regulation of suppliers or third-party
certifications. 68 If the fishing industries practice nefarious activities at sea,
corporations originally demanding fish from that particular source seek
out other suppliers who do not practice procedures that frequently lead to
human rights abuses, thus rooting fish illegally caught out through the
supply chain. 69
Third party certifications have little potential in the future, given that
the few existing third parties generally have not certified any fishing
companies in problem countries, such as Thailand, and have a limited
presence in such areas. 70 When a presence is shown, it remains extremely
limited and, consequently, the impact remains too small to accomplish
major reforms as well. 71
Direct regulation of suppliers has an immediate impact on countries
frequently engaging in illegal fishing practices, because it incentivizes
buyers to scrutinize their suppliers’ practices to protect their own
reputations. 72 That said, these practices are also limited in their ability to
address larger labor problems in the fisheries and do not directly address
the working conditions themselves, nor the benefits suppliers have for
continuing these practices. 73 Additionally, private sector responses, such
as this, are limited in scope, because it is left up to the independent
corporation on whether they want to ban fish caught through unethical
means or not. 74
D. Anti-Trafficking Measures
Another strategy that is often used as a remedial measure for
addressing past abuses involve various anti-trafficking measures. Antitrafficking measures are usually appropriate after labor violations have
68. Melissa Marschke & Peter Vandergeest, Slavery Scandals: Unpacking Labour
Challenges and Policy Responses within the Off-Shore Fisheries Sector, 68 Marine Pol’y
39, 43 (2016).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 43-44.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 44.
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already occurred. 75 This is because these practices involve rescuing abused
workers, boarding them in safe houses, and providing legal representation
for abused workers. 76
Though this is often a stable remedial measure, anti-trafficking
measures are often unhelpful in changing workers’ rights or changing the
broad legal landscape. 77 Without addressing the problem at its source,
many trafficked workers who receive remedies through anti-trafficking
measures will just be replaced by other migrant workers who then get
taken advantage of as before. 78
E. Sanctions and Import Restrictions
Another proposed solution is imposing sanctions and import
restrictions on goods and services coming from countries engaging in
transshipment practices without tightly enforced regulations regarding the
practice. 79 Most notably, in recent years the European Union and the
United States have frequently proposed imposition of sanctions as an
effective solution, responding to transshipment and “illegal, unreported,
and unregulated” (hereafter “IUU”) fishing conducted by the Thai fishing
industries. 80 Sanctions were threatened and ultimately imposed on
Thailand until the Thai government implemented strategies to curtail
human rights violations consequent to transshipment practices, including:
improving labor and management services by filling labor shortages;
ensuring proper recruitment and protection of migrant workers; improving
inspection of labor conditions and criminal activity; and creating avenues
officials can take when informing workers of their rights and employers
of their responsibilities to their employees. 81 This practice incentivized the
Thai government to increase regulations and tighten surveillance over
labor practices of migrant workers aboard and increasing controls and
transparency over transshipment practices. 82

75. See generally id. at 42.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Gotev, supra note 57.
80. Lorenza Errighi et al., Global Supply Chains: Insights into the Thai Seafood Sector,
ILO ASIA-PAC. WORKING PAPER SERIES 14, 26 (2016).
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id.
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1. Drawbacks of Sanctions
That said, this solution is not without drawbacks. First, enforcing
safer labor practices through sanctions is a slow-moving process, often
taking years to correct the problem. 83 Coercing foreign governments to
comply with these demands forces the foreign government itself to initiate
domestic changes by developing strategies, instituting regulations, and
increasing government surveillance over the industry until the new
practices are sustainable. 84 This often requires years of slow-moving
progress; there is no quick fix when implementing major changes
regarding large industries.
Second, imposing sanctions, instead of directly implementing
regulations through a top-down approach, inherently provides affected
countries with additional alternative routes in practicing business without
the same level of coercion necessarily implicated when regulations are
directly imposed. For example, if an insufficient number of countries
attempt to curtail unethical transshipment practices through sanctions,
countries utilizing transshipment practices for economic gain and business
growth may not have a large enough incentive to change, because the
economic loss consequent to countries imposing sanctions may be less
than the loss fishing industries are projected to incur by discontinuing the
transshipment practices. Additionally, changes to transshipment practices
are ultimately dependent on the country engaging in unethical
transshipment practices changing their practices in favor of more ethical
maneuvers, which may not match the proposed strategies from the
sanctioning countries. This renders the action on behalf of the sanctioned
countries less effective and less expedient than a top-down approach
would necessarily create.
That said, out of the five strategies addressed above, sanctions are the
best strategy in achieving concrete steps towards improvement in
ultimately eradicating unethical transshipment practices. Though
sanctions make the path towards change slower than a more expedient,
top-down approach, it remains the most plausible and pragmatic
alternative available in causing incremental changes in the fishing
industry. Sanctions function to dilute and, ultimately, eradicate the
economic advantage that industries maintain when engaging in
transshipment practices by causing the incurrence of a larger cost than
gained through transshipment practices.

83. See id.
84. See id.
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF PAST SANCTIONS
Past implementation of sanctions by the United States and the
European Union has yielded desirable effects in curtailing the issue of
human rights violations, criminal behavior, and IUU fishing in the
fisheries. Past sanctions have been primarily centered around addressing
issues in IUU fishing and various other issues in illegal fishing practices,
such as overexploitation of fisheries and annual global financial losses due
to unreported and illegal fishing. 85 Though frequently not targeting
transshipment practices specifically, 86 existing sanctions on illegal fishing
practices present a framework for the scope and strength of sanctions
recommended and illustrates the current downfalls in existing sanctions
programs regarding similar fishing practices.
A. EU Sanctions on IUU Fishing
Transshipment is often associated with IUU fishing, which the
European Union has enforced strict regulations over.. Included in this, the
EU has listed various third countries that failed to cooperate with the EU’s
guidelines regarding IUU regulations and, if these countries continued
these practices, the EU implemented trading bans between EU member
states and listed countries. 87 Included on the list of unacceptable activities
are unreported transshipment practices, fishing without a license or
registration, fishing in a closed area or season, joint fishing with other
companies that engage in IUU fishing, and obstructing the work of
inspectors searching for compliance with proper fishing procedures. 88
Bans are held in place until transparency of the offending country’s fishing
practices is increased and concrete measures are taken to remand the
issue. 89
Since 2012, the European Union has threatened sanctions against at
least eight different Third World Countries: Fiji, Belize, Cambodia, Sri
Lanka, Panama, Vanuatu, Guinea, and Togo. 90 The European Union gave
these countries a reasonable amount of time to start identifying problems
in current fishing practices and implementing strategies to combat these
85. Ewell et al., supra note 27, at 293.
86. See id.
87. Comm. On Fisheries, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Sanctions in
the EU, Eur. Parl. Doc. IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-184, at 36 (2014) [https://perma.cc/CW9DPDX8].
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 36.
90. Id.
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shortcomings. 91 Each country was given a warning that if practices did not
change, further action would be taken, namely, trading sanctions and bans
on products imported to the EU. 92 Within a year of developing this list,
only three countries remained on the lists and sanctions were implemented
upon them. 93 Every other country implemented adequate changes based
upon the threats of sanctions alone.
Traditionally, sanctions on the fishing industries levied by countries
in the European Union were applied inconsistently, with every nation state
applying different criteria discretionarily. 94 EU regulations regarding
sanctions establish a legal framework relating to fishing, but it is
ultimately the responsibility of each member state to enforce the sanctions.
Due to the independent nature of the enforcement by the EU, application
varies significantly. 95 Additionally, the current point system established
by the EU, which determines the gravity of infringements based upon set
criteria, is not applied consistently by each country. 96 Consequently, many
nations still show an unwillingness to enforce the current EU policies
related to improper fishing procedures by other nations, diminishing the
deterrence value of existing sanctions. 97
Between various member states involved in the European Union,
stark differences remain regarding enforcement of sanctions over illegal
fishing practices. 98 For example, in 2014, France, Germany, and Finland
only had two serious infringements between them and zero penalty points
given, whereas Italy reported 538 serious infringements and Spain
reported 805 serious infringements, indicating that some member states in
the European Union either do not investigate illegal fishing practices
thoroughly or they refuse to report infringements when they are found. 99

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (Cambodia, Belize, and Guinea were the only countries on the list who did not
respond to the initial warning and needed further action taken by the EU before cleaning
up their fishing practices).
94. Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 192) 7 (2017), Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM:2017:192:FIN&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/U5FRKVNE].
95. See Id. at 7-8.
96. Id.
97. Commission Warns Lack of Enforcement is Undermining EU Fisheries Law,
CLIENTEARTH (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.clientearth.org/commission-warns-lackenforcement-undermining-eu-fisheries-law/ [https://perma.cc/NT72-HUH9].
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Other problems in enforcing sanctions, penalties, and other deterrent
forces remain. Studies indicate that fines for illegal fishing are rare and,
when implemented, are often relatively low in cost; again, this renders the
deterrent value in such action very small. 100 Additionally, in a study
evaluating enforcement of EU fishery laws in Poland, Spain, England,
France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, all of the countries studied
demonstrated noticeable delay in implementing the laws on fishing
industries grounded domestically and all of their enforcement practices
lack transparency, leading to serious contemplation of whether EU
regulations are being met at all. 101
B. United States Sanctions on IUU Fishing
The International Stability Operations Association 102 encourages that
sanctions should be so severe as to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate
IUU fishing and strip countries engaging in such behavior of any economic
incentive to continue these practices. 103 The United States regularly
sanctions countries engaged in such behavior, with cases often settling for
several hundred thousand dollars and various other criminal sanctions,
including forfeiting catch or ships and implementing tracking systems on
ships. 104
Though the United States’ sanctions remain among the strongest in
the world, more is needed to combat illegal fishing practices occurring
during the process of transshipment. Various acts like the Lacey Act help
combat some forms of illegal fishing by prohibiting trade in fish illegally

100. Id.
101. Slipping Through the Net - The Control and Enforcement of Fisheries in France,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK (England), CLIENTEARTH (Sep. 29,
2017),
https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-info/slipping-through-the-netthe-control-and-enforcement-of-fisheries-in-france-ireland-the-netherlands-poland-spainand-the-uk-england/ [https://perma.cc/5QRE-LXZY].
102. Our Mission, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION,
https://stability-operations.site-ym.com/page/Mission (The International Stability
Operations Association, previously known as the International Peace Operations
Association, is a trade association dedicated to increasing stability and growth in businesses
run within unstable regions of the world). [https://perma.cc/V86P-ZGQT].
103. See National Plan of Action of the United States of America to Prevent, Deter, and
Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 8,
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mat165160.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ78-WQZQ].
104. Id.
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caught, possessed, transported, or sold. 105 That said, due to the
transnational nature of the crimes committed and the lack of transparency
of fishing practices, enforcement of regulations and sanctions against IUU
practices are often indirect and go unnoticed until after the violation has
occurred, rendering a halt of the illegal practices altogether extremely
difficult. 106
Though enforcement of sanctions related to illegal fishing practices
that involve transshipment and human rights violations remain relatively
rare across the board, when sanctions are seriously threatened or levied
against the offending country, positive deterrent effects and substantial
progress made on combatting human rights violations on board fishing
vessels generally occur. 107
C. Case Study: Thailand
Given a variety of factors, including rapid industrialization, rapid
increases in technological costs, and depleted fisheries, profit margins
drastically narrowed in Thai fisheries over the past thirty years, forcing
operators to find new ways of reducing their costs. 108 Consequently, many
vessel operators turned to human trafficking and other means of illegal
employment and working conditions to supply their crew and decrease
various labor costs. 109 Additionally, many fishing companies turned to
transshipment practices that enabled operators to stay at sea for vast
stretches of time, keeping slave workers at sea for weeks, months, or years
at a time. 110 Working conditions involved varying degrees of poor
treatment, rights, and conditions for crew members, ranging from
infractions from traditional labor standards to major human rights
105. Lacey
Act,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERVICE,
available
at
https://www.fws.gov/international/laws-treaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/laceyact.html [https://perma.cc/J28W-MUD8].
106. See Teale N. Phelps Bondaroff, The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus:
Illegal Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime, The Global Institute 46 (Apr. 2015),
available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/background-information/NGO
/GIATOC-Blackfish/Fishing_Crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K5L-M34G].
107. See id. at 69.
108. See Thailand, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/naso_thailand/en [https://perma.cc
/KSW8-TF62].
109. Hidden Chains: Rights Abuses and Forced Labor in Thailand’s Fishing Industry,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/23/hiddenchains/rights-abuses-and-forced-labor-thailands-fishing-industry
[https://perma.cc/3QDU-WURX].
110. See id
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abuses. 111 The Thai government refused to respond to the issue, turning a
blind eye to even the most egregious practices, until the European Union
and the United States decided to implement various sanction programs to
make current fishery practices economically disadvantageous. 112
As a response to the human rights violations epidemic, the European
Commission issued Thailand a yellow card in April 2015, identifying it as
a possible non-cooperating country in the fight against IUU fishing, with
a subsequent “red card” leading to European Union Sanctions. 113 The
United States also heightened scrutiny over Thai fisheries, increasing
threats of sanctions if prompt action was not taken to curtail illegal fishing
and the human rights violations involved. 114
In response, Thailand overhauled their fishing industry’s monitoring,
control, and management regimes. 115 New interagency inspection
frameworks were established and now there are teams of individuals
inspecting the fishing vessels every time they depart and arrive in a port.
116
Laws and penalties for violations of laws and human rights have been
increased substantially. 117 Though further action is needed to eradicate
the human rights violations at sea, threats of sanctions were effective in
getting the Thai government to respond to the human rights violations
occurring due to heinous activity on the high seas. 118
D. Case Study: New Zealand
In 2009 and 2011, research revealed that New Zealand fisheries were
engaging in illegal fishing practices resulting in IUU fishing and a variety
of human rights violations carried against migrant workers on board. 119
Many of these fishing vessels are owned by South Korean companies that
trafficked Indonesian migrant workers and held workers under severely

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE, 12 (2013), available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_214472.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LY4J-WT5B].
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exploitative working conditions. 120 These conditions included: physical
and verbal abuse; being forced to work days without rest; earning between
$260 and $460 a month before paying most of it back to “agents;” being
forced to stand in the hot sun for hours if they worked too slow; denied
proper safety conditions; made to work while sick and injured; were
constantly beaten; and denied proper food, clothing, and showers. 121
Publicizing this research, and threatening New Zealand fisheries with
negative international perceptions of all New Zealand exports created the
incentive New Zealand needed to start reforming their fishing industry. 122
Authorities have sufficiently modified the existing fishing management
regime to address violations caused by illegal fishing practices and have
guaranteed workers on fishing vessels protections under domestic labor
laws, including increased oversight and tracking of ships. 123
Evaluating past approaches in combating IUU fishing as well as
previous case studies combatting similar issues provides a surplus of
potential strategies going forward that can ultimately provide solutions to
the problem of human rights violations occurring during the transshipment
process.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD
To combat human rights violations at sea, world leaders, including
members states in the European Union and the United States, must act
against both fishing industries that continue unregulated transshipment
practices as well as the industry’s countries that turn a blind eye towards
such abuses. One of the primary alternatives for effectively curtailing
clandestine transshipment practices is to impose rigid sanctions upon
countries engaging in such behavior. 124 That said, the current sanctioning
procedures practiced by world leaders need to be strengthened for this
strategy to be effective. 125
120. Christina Stringer & Glenn Simmons, Forced into Slavery: New Zealand, ICSF,
65 (Jul. 2013), available at https://www.icsf.net/en/samudra/detail/EN/3893.html
[https://perma.cc/4T43-8JTV].
121. John Braddock, Slave Labour Conditions in New Zealand’s Fishing Industry,
International Committee of the Fourth International (Jul. 9, 2011), available at
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/07/fish-j09.html [https://perma.cc/8BUY-DXY9].
122. See Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2014,
60 (Aug. 7, 2014), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0060/latest
/DLM4794406.html [https://perma.cc/6B44-C84A].
123. Id.
124. See Bondaroff, supra at 106, 69.
125. See id.
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First, sanctions need to be uniformly applied to countries that turn a
blind eye to transshipment practices by all member states in the European
Union. It cannot be left up to each member state on how they enforce such
sanctions, because, in the past, when such freedom was given to member
states, certain states would not enforce the regulations consistently,
negating the deterrent value of the sanctions to begin with and allowing
transshipment practices to continue. 126 Corresponding with this uniform
push, it is highly recommended that member states in the European Union
develop a rigid point system that every member state adheres to, there are
strict guidelines on how to enforce the sanctions, and there is increased
transparency between the member states on how each state improves their
imposition of sanctions on offending countries. 127 Additionally, it is
recommended that a fine, penalty, or some other deterrent force is imposed
upon member countries who do not readily comply with the new
sanctioning procedures. 128
Along similar lines, countries who do threaten sanctions upon
countries who continue to practice shady fishing practices involving
transshipment need to follow through with further actions to disincentive
countries from continuing. Many times, both the EU and the United States
have threatened sanctions, civil and criminal penalties, as well as other
consequences for continuing with IUU fishing or other nefarious behavior
within the fishing industries without following through on those threats
when the country in question failed to change fishing behaviors to reflect
appropriate standards. 129 This practice of giving empty threats that do not
carry any teeth allows the country to continue using the same practices as
before, without any penalty being imposed. Following through on the
threats, however, will hinder those countries currently being targeted by
the EU and the United States and send a warning out to other offending
countries that follow through will occur if threats are made and changes
do not happen.
Additionally, both member countries within the European Union as
well as the United States should increase the fine amounts imposed on
violating countries to increase their deterrent effects.130 Given that one of
the major weaknesses behind past sanctions was the weak deterrent value
of the fines previously imposed because of their low cost, strict

126. Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 192), supra note 92, at 7.
127. See generally id.
128. See generally id.
129. See Commission Warns Lack of Enforcement is Undermining EU Fisheries Law,
note 94.
130. See id.
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implementation of higher fines is highly recommended, because it would
increase the cost of continuing such practices until the costs become
sufficiently higher than the benefit of continuing shady transshipment
practices would be. 131
Governments should also incentivize private businesses who do
purchase their fish supply from suppliers who practice responsible fishing
practices involving increased surveillance on ships, strict transshipment
practices, and meeting minimum work place conditions. This would
foreseeably increase the number of companies willing to commit to
banning transshipment at sea through their supply chains. 132 Through
either penalizing businesses that do not take steps to address the issue or
by giving companies who do purchase their fish from responsible
suppliers, more businesses can be effectively incentivized to partake in
safe catching and fishing practices, combining private and public action to
form a more aggressive attack on the underlying issue. 133
Finally, it is recommended that world leaders not only threaten and
impose sanctions upon countries with fishing industries that are caught
committing human rights violations, but penalize those who do not remain
transparent in their practices. Tactics in implementing this strategy
include: increasing camera surveillance on ships, particularly on small
vessels who remain the least regulated and, consequently, more open to
abuse; requiring companies to keep detailed records on the timing and
location of their routes; installing tracking devices; digitalizing records;
and requiring all ships have a unique identifier onboard the vessel that
serves the function of increasing transparency on board fishing vessels,
which increases the accountability of those industries as well. 134
Sanctioning countries that do not partake in measures that increase
transparency should sufficiently incentivize them to do so, which will
either decrease instances of abuse through the Hawthorne Effect or
increase awareness of instances of abuse, giving world leaders more
knowledge relating to such abuses, with which they can pursue further
action. 135

131. See generally id.
132. See Avery Siciliano, Corporate Coordination Can Stop Seafood Slavery,
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green
/news/2017/04/03/429665/corporate-coordination-can-stop-seafood-slavery/
[https://perma.cc/86MN-H9UG].
133. See id.
134. Middlehurst, supra note 25.
135. See generally id.
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A. Application: Argentina Case Study
A hypothetical application of these general principles can be tested
on a current transshipment hotspot to further illustrate the point; namely,
Argentina. Currently, off the coast of Argentina, approximately two
hundred to five hundred fishing boats are searching the limits of
Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone for fresh catch. 136 Primary actors
include fishing boats from China, Spain, and South Korea, among many
others from various countries around the world. 137 Most of these ships are
engaging in transshipment practices while they do so, opening up the door
to IUU fishing, human rights violations, and decreasing surveillance over
fishing practices. 138 Further, many of these ships are using inadequate
fishing practices and systems and are changing their forms of
identification, such as names and flags, to avoid being recognized, fined,
or caught while engaging in nefarious activity, including commission of a
wide variety of human rights abuses. 139 Applying the proposed
recommendations to the Argentina case study will illustrate how human
rights violations can be effectively eradicated during the transshipment
process.
First, EU member countries, as well as the United States, need to
come together in sanctioning countries caught fishing off the coast of
Argentina who are suspected of trafficking practices during transshipment.
A unified approach is vital to present as strong of a defense against the
activity as possible. Further, strict enforcement needs to be agreed upon
amongst member countries and applied uniformly. Given that many
countries decide not to enforce sanctions or, when sanctioning countries,
set the cost so low the effectiveness of the sanctioning process is diluted,140
an enforceable agreement between sanctioning countries is highly
recommended, with accountability from other member countries in the EU
in place, increasing the strength of the threat of sanctions.
Second, an in-depth study on the projected savings of fishing
companies engaging in transshipment over using ethical means needs to
be estimated and the sanctions placed on countries permitting unethical
transshipment processes need to cost more than that amount. Historically,
low sanction costs have rendered the sanctioning process ineffective,
136. Damian Profeta, The South Atlantic is a Scrum of the World’s Illegal Fishing
Vessels, THE NEWS LENS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://international.thenewslens.com/article
/91191 [https://perma.cc/S34A-Z28E].
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 192), supra note 92, at 7.
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because the sanction costs have cost participating countries less than
abandoning current fishing practices would. 141 This needs to be flipped for
sanctions to become a more effective way of curtailing illegal fishing
practices. The cost of continuing needs to be outweighed by the cost of
change enough to effectively force countries engaging in or permitting
unethical transshipment practices to change their behavior and ultimately
become both more open and ethical with their fishing practices.
Third, not only do sanctions need to be placed on countries who
knowingly permit their fishing industries to engage in inhumane practices
during transshipment, but sanctions also need to be placed on countries
who do not require their fishing boats to remain transparent. Expectations
regarding surveillance on board, tracking devices placed on ships, the
amount of time ships can stay abroad without returning to shore, and
meticulous data tracking all need to be set by the EU and the United
States. 142 In the Argentina example, countries currently known for their
lack of transparency in transshipment practices off the coast of Argentina,
such as China, South Korea, and Spain need to be informed of these
expectations of transparency. 143 The EU and the United States must make
threats of sanctions if the expectations are not met. If these countries
continue to employ transshipment practices lacking transparency and set
ethical standards, sanctions need to be implemented; empty threats of
sanctions are insufficient to curtail the problem.
Finally, the private sector needs to be incorporated into the solution
as well. Businesses need incentives, whether it be tax or otherwise, for
purchasing from suppliers they know are committed to ethical fishing
practices. 144 Though industry leaders such as Thai Union, Nestle, and Mars
have already committed to eradicating labor abuses, lack of transparency,
and banning transshipment through their supply chains, the response from
the business sector has ultimately been mixed, with actions from watchdog
groups and pockets of public awareness. 145 Increasing the tax breaks
companies who refuse to purchase from fishing industries engaging in the
non-transparent transshipment actions off the coast of Argentina or,
conversely, penalizing companies who continue to purchase their supply
fish from this source will ultimately incentive more industry leaders to
look for fish in places where transparency, transshipment, and poor

141. See Commission Warns Lack of Enforcement is Undermining EU Fisheries Law,
supra note 95.
142. See Middlehurst, supra note 25.
143. See Profeta, supra note 132.
144. See id.
145. Siciliano, supra note 128.
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working conditions are not an issue. Further, combining the private and
public sectors in aggressively correcting shady transshipment practices
currently operating off the coast of Argentina.
The problem of transshipment off the coast of Argentina is large and
complex, but far from unsolvable. A unified force bonding various
influential countries around the world and combining the public and
private sectors can be assembled and enforced to solve transshipment
issues wherever they occur, including off the coast of Argentina. A
combination of instituting strict guidelines for sanctions across the board
that are actively enforced by a large number of countries, targeting ships
who lack transparency and surveillance, increasing the sanctions’ costs,
and incentivizing private corporations to play a role in rooting out
transshipped fish through its supply chain will ultimately lead to a stronger
defense implemented in countering the issue of transshipment and the
human rights violations it often breeds.
VII. CONCLUSION
Transshipment, the process of offloading catch from a fishing vessel
onto a larger refrigerated cargo ship often while on the high seas, has led
to a wide array of human rights abuses taking place throughout the fishing
industry, including: poor working conditions, slave labor, physical abuse,
human trafficking, and murder. 146 Reasons for this abuse include: the
lower cost of using slave labor that incentivizes the practice, the lack of
transparency and surveillance on board smaller fishing vessels, the
sparsity of returns back to shore by those vessels, and the lack of laws on
the books regarding transshipment on the high seas. 147 Though several
watchdog groups have taken notice of this over the past several years, little
has been done to counter these human rights abuses. 148 Accordingly, swift
action is needed to counter these threats to human rights abuses create a
more ethically driven fishing industry internationally.
Because of the lack of transparency and surveillance on board fishing
vessels engaging in transshipment practices, data regarding the scale and
146. The Global View of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary Findings, supra note 3,
at 1.
147. Id.
148. See generally Mike Gaworecki, To Help Stop Illegal Fishing, Ban Practice of
Transshipment on High Seas, Researchers Say, Mongabay (May 1, 2017), https://news.
mongabay.com/2017/05/to-help-stop-illegal-fishing-ban-practice-of-transshipment-onhigh-seas-researchers-say/ [https://perma.cc/NQ42-4B9K] (stating that watchdog groups
such as Oceana, Global Fishing Watch, SkyTruth, and the journal of Marine Policy have
taken notice of the issue of transshipment and brought public attention to the issue).
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scope of transshipment and the human rights violations that occur during
the process remains difficult to acquire. 149 Further, because most abuses
happen on the high seas where no specific country has territorial control,
there is only a limited patchwork of regulations over transshipment
practices. 150 These regulations remain difficult to enforce, given the lack
of surveillance on the ships that makes it difficult to ascertain when and
where human rights violations occur, as well as the fact that many
violations occur in places where no one country has jurisdiction, rendering
the existing regulations inapplicable. 151
There are many proposed solutions for countering human rights
abuses on the high seas, all of which have their strengths and weaknesses.
That said, of the strategies proposed in the past, the strongest strategy is
the imposition of sanctions, which involves goods and services coming in
from countries engaging in shady transshipment practices that are
currently trading with other countries having trading restrictions and costs
imposed until they change their behavior. Regarding IUU fishing,
sanctions have been threatened and placed on both Thailand and New
Zealand, ultimately leading to corrected behavior from both countries that
ultimately rooted out shady practices that created situations where human
rights violations were frequently taking place.152
Though sanctions have produced the desired result in the past, many
weaknesses exist behind past applications of sanctions by both the United
States and the European Union. Weaknesses such as inconsistent
application, too low of costs imposed, lack of follow through with threats
when sanctions are threatened, lack of set criteria to judge behavior by,
and the unwillingness of certain countries in the EU to enforce the
sanctions have collectively rendered sanctions not as effective as they
otherwise could be in addressing this issue. 153 Thus, a more
comprehensive solution to the transshipment problem involves
recognizing these shortcomings behind past approaches and developing
improved strategies with them in mind, effectively curtailing unethical
149. See Fisheries Abuses and Related Deaths at Sea in the Pacific Region, supra note
14, at 5-7.
150. The Global View of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary Findings, supra note 3,
at 1.
151. Id.
152. See Hidden Chains: Rights Abuses and Forced Labor in Thailand’s Fishing
Industry, supra note 109; Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters)
Amendment Act 2014, supra note 122 at 124.
153. See generally Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Sanctions in the EU,
supra note 86, at 36; National Plan of Action of the United States of America to Prevent,
Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing, supra note 101, at 8.
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behavior by imposing large economic disincentives upon those who
continue such practices.
Addressing the transshipment problem will require many countries,
especially developed and powerful nations such as those in the European
Union and the United States, coming together and following through with
implementation of sanctions with high enough costs to strip whatever
economic incentives exist within current transshipment practices that
produce human rights violations. Sanctioning countries must expand
threatened sanctions to countries known for human rights violations, and
countries who do not foster fishing practices with a high level of
transparency and surveillance on board, because lack of transparency and
surveillance is often a breeding ground for such abuses. Finally, the private
sector and businesses need to be rewarded for keeping illegally caught fish
out of their supply chain.
Though the problem with transshipment remains massive and
complex, it is solvable. That said, it will require stable enforcement of
sanctions, and other tactics to disincentive continuing the practice from a
large pocket of the world for steady progress to occur and, eventually, stop
human rights abuses from happening against some of the world’s most
vulnerable people trapped in the practice.

